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The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Africa’s Sustainable Development: 
A Case Study of Kenya*
Jing Gu1 and Shen Qiu2
Abstract There is extensive international debate over the contribution 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to achieving the global Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The potential for the BRI to make a substantial 
contribution to realising the SDGs has been acknowledged by leading 
global, regional, and national representatives. The BRI as a developmental 
project with global reach is heavily backed financially by China, and 
reflects the need for stronger instruments to implement and deliver 
on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs. Yet, 
there are practical challenges in the BRI–SDG relationship set against an 
international debate centred on concerns, criticisms, and ‘pushback’. This 
article assesses this relationship and provides a comprehensive examination 
of China–Kenya cooperation under the BRI and its implications for Kenyan 
implementation of the SDGs. Its arguments are based on both official 
documents and data, and primary research. Its findings contribute to the 
discussion on the potential of the BRI for Africa’s sustainable development.
Keywords: China, Belt and Road Initiative, Kenya, Sustainable 
Development Goals, Africa, investment, Mombasa–Nairobi Standard 
Gauge Railway, health, sustainable development.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed in 2013 by China’s 
president, Xi Jinping, and officially launched in 2015, is justified as a 
global development project that aims:
[T]o promote the connectivity of  Asian, European and African 
continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen 
partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up 
all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks, and 
realise diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development 
in these countries (China National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  Commerce).
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In recent years, the BRI has evolved into a worldwide project (Zou 2018). 
The BRI is now a multidimensional, multilayered project. However, at 
its core, it concentrates on building greater capacity, principally through 
infrastructure with a focus on transport, communications, and energy. 
The BRI involves China underwriting hundreds of  billions (and perhaps 
trillions, eventually) of  US dollars of  infrastructure investment across 
the world. The key agencies primarily responsible for disbursing BRI 
funding include the Silk Road Fund, the China Development Bank, and 
the Export–Import Bank of  China (China Exim Bank). The multilateral 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is also a major financier of  
the BRI.
The BRI is moving into a new phase, undergoing what is being 
described as a shift from painting the broad strokes to refining the details 
(The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 
2019a, 2019b). The second Belt and Road Forum reached an extensive 
consensus on promoting ‘high-quality cooperation’ under the BRI, 
stressing open, green, and clean approaches, as well as goals of  
high-standard, livelihood-improving, and sustainable development 
(Xinhua News 2019). Up to 30 April 2019, China had signed 187 
BRI cooperation documents with 131 countries and 30 international 
organisations, including 39 African countries and the African Union 
(Belt and Road Portal 2019). However, this article examines the 
following question: what does the BRI contribute to Africa’s sustainable 
development? The article indicates aspects of  China’s development 
cooperation with Africa, particularly as this cooperation intersects with 
the evolving BRI, and considers the case of  Kenya – an important BRI 
strategic partner.
The objective of  this article is to explain and evaluate how African 
states engage with the BRI. It provides an examination of  China–Kenya 
cooperation under the BRI and its implications for the Kenyan economy 
and sustainable development. The study is spurred by a continuing 
debate over the impact on African development as the BRI moves into 
a new evolutionary phase. The article’s arguments are based on both 
official documents and data, and primary research, and its findings 
contribute to the wider debate by exemplifying the Kenya case, which is 
valuable for observing the potential of  the BRI for Africa’s sustainable 
development. The article is also grounded in, and takes its point of  
departure from, the wider development literature on aid and sustainable 
development, and works that seek to relate the BRI to this broader 
context with the breadth of  perspectives embodied within them.
2 The BRI’s engagement in Africa
2.1 The basis of China–Africa cooperation
China has a long history of  providing fraternal support and solidarity 
with African independence movements and post-independence states. 
The advent of  the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the 
publication of  China’s Africa Policy in 2006, and the implementation 
of  China’s ‘Going Out’ policy for the internationalisation of  Chinese 
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enterprises provided the context, within which the past two decades have 
seen China’s engagement with Africa transition from primarily political 
relations to one grounded substantively in economic and development 
relations. Adding to the FOCAC process are initiatives of  the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Gu et al. 2016; Cabestan 
2019), through trilateral cooperation arrangements such as the Africa–
Britain–China (ABC) initiative (Gu 2017).
Despite the impetus towards stronger Sino-African cooperation, 
there is far from a consensus over China’s role and impact in Africa 
with differing perspectives and interpretations at play in the debate. 
Juxtaposed to the view that China’s involvement in Africa is not 
altruistic, but based on a realistic and practical partnership of  reciprocal 
needs and mutual gains, are detailed data analyses assessing aspects such 
as China’s economic impact on Africa (Oqubay and Lin 2019; Jayaram, 
Kassiri and Sun 2017); China’s role in mitigating poverty and inequality 
in Africa (Huu and Schwiebert 2019); ‘responsible engagement’ (Xu 
2017: 1), including China’s changing approach to global corporate 
social responsibility (Agbebi 2018; Ho 2017; Liu 2015); and China’s 
environmental footprint in Africa (Shinn 2015; Compagnon and 
Alejandro 2013; China House 2018).
The academic and policy-oriented literature on Sino-African relations is 
substantial (Gu and Carey 2019; Mbaidjol 2018; Zhao 2017; Xu 2017; 
United States House of  Representatives 2018; United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations 2017; Gu and McCluskey 2015; 
Alden and Alves 2015; Okolo and Akwu 2015; Gadzala 2015; van Dijk 
2011; Raine 2009; Alden 2007; Alden and Davies 2006). This literature 
provides a broad spectrum of  perspectives. Indicative of  the critical 
perspective is the argument that China is simply replicating the so-called 
‘resources curse’ of  many of  its developing partners, which in effect locks 
these economies into structural underdevelopment and undermines 
Africa’s own efforts to undertake effective sustainable development and 
to strengthen the quality of  African governance. This perspective is 
clearly expressed by Lawson-Remer and Greenstein: ‘Instead of  creating 
prosperity, resources have too often fostered corruption, undermined 
inclusive economic growth, incited armed conflict and damaged the 
environment’ (2012: 21). The literature includes perspectives that portray 
China as a spectre haunting Africa (Lee 2018), as invading Africa (Dok 
and Thayer 2019), and as the latest in a long line of  neo-colonial powers 
intent on exploiting Africa’s natural and human resources (Su 2017; 
Insaidoo 2016; Junbo and Frasheri 2014; Rich and Recker 2013).
2.2 The changing position of Africa in the development process of the BRI
During the BRI’s initial stages, the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building 
Silk Road and Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road3 
implied that the BRI should mainly focus on the connectivity along Asia 
and Europe. Its roadmap did not explicitly cover Africa. On 4 December 
2015, the Chinese government issued the second China–Africa Policy, 
which is the guiding policy document. The African component of  the 
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BRI has taken time to establish. Nonetheless, by April 2019, 39 out of  
53 African countries, and the African Union, had signed BRI-related 
Memoranda of  Understanding (MoUs) with China. Despite a relatively 
slow early beginning, the BRI is now at the core of  China–Africa 
development cooperation, trade, and investment, and is a central 
component of  China’s working relationship with the African Union (AU).
In 2018, China’s total import and export volume with Africa was 
US$204.19bn, a year-on-year increase of  19.7 per cent. China’s exports 
to Africa were US$104.91bn, up 10.8 per cent and China’s imports 
from Africa were US$99.28bn, up 30.8 per cent; the surplus was 
US$5.63bn, down 70 per cent year-on-year (MOFCOM 2019). The 
BRI’s concentration on infrastructure capacity building is variously 
portrayed as a means of  politically stabilising Africa (Korybko 2019), or 
the key to unlocking Africa’s need for infrastructure. African states have 
an imperative need for high-quality infrastructure. Africa’s transport, 
electrification, and communications capacity is among the lowest in the 
world. The African Development Bank suggests that the continent’s 
infrastructure needs amount to US$130–170bn a year, with a financing 
gap in the range of  US$68–108bn (ADB 2019: 18). The September 
2018 FOCAC saw China sign MoUs with 37 African countries and the 
AU on jointly developing the Belt and Road.
China’s BRI project has established a significant network of  cooperation 
links with African countries. For example, the 756km Ethiopia–Djibouti 
electrified railway connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti Port; the 
US$3.5bn Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port and international free trade 
zone; a new standard gauge railway in Tanzania; the Maputo–Katembe 
bridge in Mozambique – opened in November 2018, with a main 
span of  680 metres, the bridge is the longest of  its kind in Africa; and 
in August 2017, the China Gezhouba Group announced a US$4.5bn 
contract to build a 2,172MW hydropower plant in Angola, which, when 
completed, will supply up to half  the country’s total electricity.4
3 China–Kenya cooperation under the BRI: progress and challenges
3.1 Overview
According to Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta:
The Belt and Road Initiative gives our continent the opportunity 
to make a paradigm shift. Post-colonial Africa has been stuck in a 
rut… It will be a win-win situation when our people have the skills, 
assets and financing necessary to participate in the development of  
the infrastructure corridors that will enhance connectivity, support 
trade and reduce the cost of  doing business between our countries… 
We will all win when the economic corridors we develop hasten 
industrialisation; and when they hasten the development of  domestic 
private-sector capabilities (Xinhua News 2017a).
Kenya has been one of  the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa: the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) annual growth 
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rate averaged 5.45 per cent from 2004 to 2018 (Trading Economics 
2019). Nevertheless, despite the sustained economic growth and clear 
improvements across the range of  human development indices, the 
development challenges facing Kenya remain substantial. The 2017 
Human Capital Index’s (HCI) key finding was that a child born in Kenya 
today is 52 per cent of  who s/he could be with complete education and 
full health (UNDP 2018a). Almost 40 per cent of  Kenyans live in poverty 
with 14.5 per cent in extreme poverty. The country’s unemployment 
rate stood at 11.5 per cent in 2017, above the average of  10.8 per cent 
for the period 1991–2017. The population is also vulnerable to natural 
disaster. In 2017, the Kenyan government declared a severe drought to 
be a national emergency, with 23 of  47 counties affected. It was reported 
that 5.6 million people were in need of  humanitarian assistance with 
3.4 million people food-insecure (UNDP 2018b: 9).
Kenya’s 2017 Human Development Index (HDI) value was calculated 
at 0.590, placing the country in the medium human development 
category with a ranking of  142 out of  189 countries and territories 
(UNDP 2018a). In addition, in the assessment of  the UN’s Human 
Capital project, Kenya’s HCI for 2017 was ‘higher than what would be 
predicted for its income level’ with Kenya’s HCI ranking 94 out of  157 
(World Bank 2018a: 2). The aim of  the HCI project is to raise awareness 
and increase demand for interventions to build human capital.
In response to this aim for interventions to build human capital 
and to accelerate progress in raising human capital outcomes, the 
Kenyan government is pursuing its long-term national development 
Vision 2030. The aim of  this strategy is to turn the country into a newly 
industrialising, ‘middle-income country providing a high-quality life to 
all its citizens by 2030’ (Kenya Vision 2030, 2018). The strategy sets out 
the so-called Big Four development priorities: manufacturing, universal 
health care, affordable housing, and food security. This is promoting 
national economic development by increasing infrastructure, promoting 
sustainable development and accelerating poverty eradication (World 
Bank 2018b). The Kenyan government identifies investment in 
infrastructure capacity building as the critical means by which to 
achieve its sustainable development objectives. Kenya’s industrial 
transformation programme is intended to increase the country’s 
manufacturing base and exports. A key factor is the need for transport, 
communications, energy, and water infrastructure capacity building. 
This requires large-scale funding and implementation expertise, a 
value-added and comparative advantage possible through engagement 
with the BRI.
As a 2017 Chatham House assessment of  the Standard Gauge Railway 
(SGR) project reflected, ‘whether the partnership with China can 
deliver sustainable development will be much harder to determine, and 
is a question that will shape Kenyan politics for many years to come’ 
(Chatham House 2017). What then is the alignment between the BRI, 
the SDGs, and Kenya’s Vision 2030 with consideration to implementing 
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the SDGs? There are three aspects to this. Firstly, the BRI provides an 
existing, functioning framework of  finance, organisation, and project 
experience with which to potentially help Kenya deliver on its national 
economic programme, SDG strategy, and HCI interventions.
Secondly, the approach to development and the aims of  the BRI 
embodied in its 2015 Vision (2015) are held by leading officials of  the 
major global and regional intergovernmental organisations to coalesce 
with the 17 SDGs. Reflecting this, the second Belt and Road Forum’s 
(BRF) List of  Deliverables indicates that the BRI’s work programme 
actively engages with the SDGs, explicitly mainstreaming the SDGs 
into its industrialisation, health, education, energy, and environmental 
policies and implementation strategies (The Second Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation 2019c; UN Environment 2018).
Thirdly, the SDGs were formally launched in Kenya in September 
2016 and implementation began. This process has mainstreamed 
both the SDGs and the AU Agenda 2063 into the preparation of  the 
third Medium-Term Programme (2018–22) and the second County 
Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), providing the policy framework 
through which to engage the BRI. The following discussion considers 
these issues with respect to trade, investment, and health.
3.2 Trade
China became Kenya’s largest trading partner in 2014 (Etyang 2015) 
and Kenya established itself  as China’s sixth largest trading partner in 
Africa (White and Case 2018). In 2017, Kenya’s imports from China 
reached US$3,778bn, accounting for approximately 23 per cent of  
Kenya’s total imports. However, Kenya’s exports to China in 2017 were 
worth only US$96.7m, representing 1.68 per cent of  Kenya’s total 
exports (World Bank 2017).
Over 90 per cent of  China’s main exports to Kenya are made up 
by higher-value finished products, machinery and transportation 
equipment, and miscellaneous products. In return, Kenya’s exports 
to China are low-value agricultural and natural resources. Oil and, 
increasingly, titanium exports offer Kenya the potential for future 
higher-value exports to China, and recent agreement on the export of  
additional agricultural products such as avocados and floriculture are 
also raising the prospect for increased exports to China and revenue 
generation. China is an important export market for Kenya’s titanium. 
In the first nine months of  2017, Kenya’s titanium exports totalled 
US$93.81m (Yunch Titanium 2018).
A number of  long-standing concerns have been raised in Kenya about 
its trade relationship with China, with Kenya portrayed as getting 
a raw deal in its China trade. These concerns begin with the sheer 
size of  the deficit and the minimal volume, value, low value-added 
of  Kenyan exports, and the heavy dependency on titanium. In 2017, 
Kenya’s export value to China was 2 per cent of  China’s total, and 
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imports from China represented 23 per cent of  the total. Whilst imports 
of  equipment and materials were needed to construct Phase I of  the 
flagship Sino-Kenyan cooperation project, the US$3.6bn SGR between 
Mombasa and Nairobi may have temporarily inflated Kenyan imports 
from China and the further development of  the rail network may have 
prolonged this effect. If  the SGR is taken out of  the equation, then the 
underlying economic structural problem for Kenya remains. Further 
concerns focus on the undercutting of  local manufacturers, either 
by the alleged dumping of  Chinese goods or by import growth from 
China driven by the preference of  Kenyan traders for cheaper and 
speedier stock, including goods made in Kenya. There are also civil 
society claims of  Chinese neo-colonialism; for instance, the Pan-African 
Alliance’s assertion that, ‘slowly but surely China’s neocolonial 
hegemony is being achieved. And it seems like Africans are powerless to 
stop it’ (Junbo and Frasheri 2014; Malik 2018; Addis and Zuping 2018).
China’s expanding trade relationship with Kenya is having a knock-on 
effect for Kenya’s domestic banks. On the one hand there is, prima facie, 
a positive impact with Kenyan banks reporting a rise in the number 
of  Chinese clients and increased commercial business with Chinese 
companies – some Kenyan banks are now issuing performance bonds 
and guarantees for Chinese companies with dedicated desks with 
Chinese-speaking staff, opening up new business opportunities and 
trade finance products. However, at the same time, Kenyan banks are 
experiencing major challenges and there are concerns that, despite their 
efforts to adapt in order to realise these new opportunities, local banks 
are not benefiting from the growth in Chinese commercial business as 
they had anticipated, being sidelined by new Chinese entrants to the 
Kenyan banking sector and by different banking practices (Wass 2018).
But the majority of  the debate over what to do about the trade deficit 
centres on how the respective governments can work together to address 
the underlying structural asymmetries to reduce the deficit. For China, 
this has meant recognising the concerns of  the Kenyan government and 
signing new agreements to allow preferential market access for Kenyan 
agricultural goods such as avocados. China and Kenya have signed a 
protocol opening up frozen avocado exports to China, but (as at June 
2019) exports of  fresh avocados were still blocked due to Chinese 
bio-safety concerns. However, whilst China’s approach and level of  
responsiveness are important factors, there are Kenyan perspectives 
that focus on what the Kenyan government can do to help adjust the 
imbalance. For example, there are arguments proposing that Kenya 
adopt a more protectionist stance. Indicative of  this perspective, the 
University of  Nairobi’s Dr Iraki argues that with a stricter regulatory 
tariff approach, Kenya ‘can become more efficient, reduce labour costs, 
create local demand by improving on the quality and in the spirit of  
“Trumponomics”, become more patriotic’ (Daily Nation 2017).
In terms of  the Kenyan government’s own negotiating position, Kenya 
has refused to sign the 2018 China–EAC Free Trade Agreement. 
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Kenya’s Trade Ministry Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo is reported as 
stating that:
China already accounts for 25 per cent of  Kenya’s import bill under 
the current common external tariff structure of  zero per cent, 10 per 
cent and 25 per cent for raw materials, intermediate goods and 
final goods respectively. This means that China is likely to get even 
a larger share of  Kenya’s market once we enter into a free trade 
arrangement (Otieno 2018).
According to Secretary Kiptoo, the Kenyan government is,
seeking a preferential, non-reciprocal trade deal, giving Kenyan 
exports duty free access to China. Such a scheme could be modelled 
on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allows 
African exports like apparel and textiles duty free access to the US 
market (Miriri 2019).
The sticking point for the Chinese government is the non-reciprocal 
element as this runs counter to its generic development philosophy and 
to its East African Community (EAC) free trade agreement. For the 
Kenyan government, the non-reciprocal provision is vital to protect its 
economy from what it believes would be a flood of  cheap imports that 
would undercut its manufacturers and continue to widen the trade gap.
3.3 Investment
China is an increasingly important investor and financier to Kenya. 
According to the then incoming Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Wu 
Peng, China’s non-financial direct investment in Kenya in 2018 had 
doubled over that of  the previous year to about US$520m (Peng 2019). 
This foreign direct investment (FDI) is primarily channelled into a 
range of  sectors, most notably, construction, industrial engineering, 
the creative industries, transportation equipment, food and beverages, 
tobacco and alcohol, information and communications technology, 
electronic products, financial services, and consumer goods. Among 
them, the construction industry has the largest scale of  investment and 
the largest number of  projects.
Kenya’s infrastructure needs are extensive, as the following examples 
illustrate. The first example is the high profile US$3.8bn Mombasa–
Nairobi SGR, described in April 2019 by Wu Peng as ‘one of  the 
benchmarks of  BRI’ (Peng 2019). The SGR has cut the transit times 
for travellers dramatically and taken vehicles off the overburdened 
road system, but issues and controversy surround it including the 
quadrupling of  the construction cost; Kenyan government debt and 
its servicing; the longer-term need to see a return on the investment 
made because of  the escalated cost; China’s unwillingness to underwrite 
the next stage of  the railway’s development; and the environmental 
implications and operational costs incurred by the choice of  diesel to 
power the engines.
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The project has two scheduled phases, Mombasa–Nairobi and Nairobi–
Malaba. The 472km Mombasa–Nairobi phase is complete and has 
been opened. The Nairobi–Malaba phase has three segments: Phase 
2A stretches a further 120km from Nairobi to Naivasha; Phase 2B adds 
270km, from Naivasha to Kisumu; and Phase 2C is a 107km extension 
from Kisumu to Malaba. This is an important project for the Kenyan 
government’s economic, developmental, and cleaner energy strategy; 
for its aim to position Kenya as a regional transport and economic hub; 
and to integrate into the BRI’s connectivity networks. This project has 
been 90 per cent funded by the China Exim Bank and post-completion 
has been managed and operated by a Chinese company. In 2014, China 
agreed to loan Kenya US$3.233bn through the China Exim Bank to 
build the railway. The loan was made up of  a US$1.633bn commercial 
loan and US$1.6bn concessional loan and the agreement provided for a 
five-year repayment grace period.
Completion of  the first phase led to Chinese government claims being 
made as to the benefits to Kenya of  this cooperation, including the 
anticipated contribution to Kenya’s GDP growth of  around 1.5 per 
cent, creation of  46,000 jobs and a multiplier effect through the 
local economy through extensive subcontracting to Kenyan firms, 
technology transfers, and mentoring through a new rail engineering 
academy, and new study and training opportunities (Xinhua News 
2017b). For the Kenyan government, this is a flagship project and, 
for both governments, is presented as a successful symbolic example 
of  cooperation and a step forward in meeting Kenya’s priorities. The 
Chinese government presents a positive record for the railway: ‘Over 
2.71 million passengers have travelled with SGR, with an average 
attendance rate of  99 per cent. Around 4.04m tonnes of  goods have 
been transported through the railway, with economic indicators 
surpassing expectations’ (Peng 2019).
However, a Kenyan ministerial statement to Parliament indicated that 
the rail link has run at a loss for both commuter and freight services 
(The Citizen 2019). Kenyan government ministers cited low freight 
business as the main cause, but claimed the railway would have a better 
future performance, achieving profitability by June 2019. However, 
media reportage of  the rail company and Kenyan national data shows 
that this expectation has not been realised. The Kenyan National Bureau 
of  Statistics (KNBS) calculated that, in the first full year of  operating, 
the SGR earnings were 44 per cent below original expectations with 
freight earnings adjusted downwards by almost 50 per cent. Repayments 
on the principal loan from the China Exim Bank would begin in July 
2019, increasing the cost of  payments substantially by a factor of  six to 
Ksh34.3bn (US$332m) in the 2019/20 financial year (ibid.).
Adding to this situation, China has not agreed to the Kenyan 
government’s repeated requests for funding for the Naivasha–Malaba 
section. This leaves the originally planned project in question. The 
Kenyan government did gain agreement for funding at the BRF 
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through concessional financing and public–private partnerships 
(PPP) for projects including a Konza Data Centre and Smart Cities 
Project to be undertaken by Huawei construction of  the Nairobi Jomo 
Kenyatta International Airport to James Gichuru expressway on a PPP 
arrangement with the China Road and Bridge Corporation. In addition 
to the deep concerns raised over the Kenyan government’s burgeoning 
debt servicing responsibility arising from the SGR, is a debate over 
the management practices of  the Chinese operating company (Onjala 
2018). Such accusations have appeared in a number of  Kenyan news 
reports, but none more damning than a recent online exposé news 
report, unsubstantiated and contested by the Chinese rail franchisee, 
which reports that employees are subject to racism, segregation, harsh 
disciplinary practices, and do not get to drive the engines they were 
trained to operate (Wafula 2018).
3.4 Health
This section takes health as an example of  the way that the BRI can 
contribute to Kenya’s delivery on the Medium-Term Plan (MTP), the 
HCI, the SDGs, the AU Vision 2063, and the FOCAC agenda. As is 
the case with the BRI as a whole, there are opportunities and potential 
risks associated with the dimension of  health, and concerns about its 
impact on health policy and practice. Whilst the BRI has sought to 
develop a new hub for health cooperation, labelled the Healthy Silk 
Road, the rationale to widen and increase global connectivity will 
generate a significant increase in the movement of  people and thereby 
a heightened risk of  the spread of  infectious diseases (Murphy 2018; 
Gostin 2018; Tang et al. 2017). Further issues include the potential 
possible disaster risk implications of  infrastructure mega-projects as well 
as dangers arising from the increased transboundary movement of  
hazardous materials.
Moreover, the BRI also raises the critical issue of  health safeguarding, 
i.e. the way in which the BRI in practice synchronises and conforms 
to the existing international regulation of  occupational health and 
environmental standards. The Chinese government organised the first 
biennial ‘Belt and Road High Level Meeting on Health Cooperation 
towards a Healthy Silk Road’ in August 2017. At this meeting, over 
30 health ministers and leaders of  multilateral agencies signed the 
Beijing Communiqué, which emphasised a joint commitment by the 
signatories to protect public health and strengthen people-to-people 
exchanges among BRI countries. Specific commitments included the 
creation of  new cooperation hubs (the Belt and Road Health Policy 
Research Network, the Belt and Road Hospital Alliance, and the 
Belt and Road Health Industry Sustainable Development Alliance); a 
collaboration intended to contribute to delivering the SDG monitoring, 
prevention, and control, and response to major infectious diseases.
China committed to continuing to dispatch foreign aid medical teams 
to BRI partner states and to carry out appropriate hospital cooperation 
through the Brightness Journey of  Free Cataract Surgeries and Journey of  
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Smile-Free Cleft-Palate Surgeries, and, significantly for the SDGs and for 
strengthening HCI outcomes, China will implement maternal, child, 
and reproductive health projects in the Belt and Road nations, promote 
appropriate technology in paediatrics, obstetrics, and gynaecology, and 
enhance the national maternal and child health-care and treatment 
service capabilities to improve the national health level of  women 
and children (China Daily 2017). However, the Beijing Communiqué 
has weaknesses. As an editorial in The Lancet medical journal noted, 
non-communicable diseases were not referred to, and appeared dated 
compared to China’s own 2015 Healthy China 2030 strategy, and the 
editorial hoped that the BRI’s emphasis on infrastructure development 
in Africa and elsewhere would not conflict with the aims embodied in 
China’s own Healthy China (The Lancet Global Health 2017).
To help the Kenyan government’s Big Four agenda aim of  providing 
universal health care, the government-to-government agreement 
on health provides the framework for practical cooperation on the 
construction of  hospitals and other medical infrastructure, equipment 
provision, training of  medical staff, and commercial pharmaceutical 
collaboration. In 2016, China donated four modular container clinics 
to the Kenyan Ministry of  Health to boost the response to killer 
diseases in underserved and disadvantaged communities. In 2018, the 
Chinese government supplied and installed computerised tomography 
(CT) scanners to 37 Kenyan hospitals located primarily along Kenya’s 
major highways to provide enhanced emergency diagnosis for road 
accident victims and improve survival rates. The scanners can also be 
used to detect cancer. The project involves a partnership between a 
Chinese and a Kenyan medical enterprise contracted by the Kenyan 
government. It also involves knowledge and skills sharing with 37 
Kenyan radiographers and radiologists receiving training in China 
(MT 2018).
4 Analysis: the early impact of the BRI on Kenya’s sustainable 
development
The BRI has raised criticisms that it is fuelling a debt crisis in African 
countries (Onjala 2018; Were 2018). China is accused of  conducting 
a ‘debt trap diplomacy’ (Chellaney 2017; Mendis and Wang 2019). 
Kenya’s public debt has been increasing rapidly in recent years, rising 
to around 57 per cent of  GDP in the 2017/18 fiscal year,5 and China’s 
share of  Kenya’s bilateral debt rose to 72 per cent (Business Daily 2018), 
making it Kenya’s largest bilateral creditor. The experience of  the SGR 
project has raised questions over Kenya’s indebtedness to China; over 
China’s actual commitment to the intended development outcome 
rather than to the commercial and non-commercial loan provisions; 
and over the corporate cultures and working practices of  Chinese firms. 
Kenya’s debt level is said to have risen as a result of  the increased cost 
of  the rail project.
As noted elsewhere in this article, the five-year grace period given by 
the China Exim Bank expired in June 2019. Kenyan tax-payers were 
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scheduled to begin paying 0.7 per cent of  the economy to the Chinese 
financing agencies for funding the Nairobi–Mombasa stage of  the 
SGR. Against this background and an increased risk management 
culture including tighter auditing and anti-corruption measures in 
China, funding for the scheduled extension of  the SGR would have 
been considered in the light of  the provisions of  the Guiding Principles on 
Financing the Development of  the Belt and Road. These Principles advocate 
a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory, and predictable financing 
environment that ensures sustainable economic and social development. 
Kenya is among the 26 countries that jointly formulated the Principles.
Further concerns have been raised regarding the BRI’s contribution 
to Kenya’s employment, skills, and technology transfer. Estimates of  
the number of  Chinese enterprises operating in African economies 
have varied over the years. A credible evaluation was undertaken by 
McKinsey and Company based on its field survey of  eight African 
countries between November 2016 and March 2017. The survey 
concluded that there were 396 Chinese firms operating in Kenya, more 
than three times the Chinese government’s official number of  131 firms 
(Sun, Jayaram and Kassiri 2017). Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
in recent years, Chinese enterprises have increased the employment 
of  local labourers in Africa. Across Africa, the McKinsey survey found 
that Chinese firms display a willingness to invest in hiring African 
workers and maintaining apprenticeship programmes, and that Chinese 
enterprises overwhelmingly employ and train local workers (ibid.). 
In the case of  Kenya, a report by the Kenya China Economic and 
Trade Association (KCETA) concluded that Chinese firms operating 
in Kenya have created over 50,000 local jobs with the proportion of  
local employees reaching 96 per cent in 2018. The report also noted 
that Chinese firms in Kenya provided around 67,000 local employees 
with professional training in 2018. Commenting on this, Isaac Mbeche, 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor of  the University of  Nairobi argued that 
‘Chinese firms have been devoted to cultivating talents and creating jobs 
in Kenya, enhancing the exchanges and cooperation between the two 
countries under the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Xinhua News 2018).
However, employment issues remain. According to the Federation of  
Kenyan Employers (FKE) Executive Director Jacqueline Mugo, ‘Due to 
the lack of  knowledge of  local labour laws and the understanding of  the 
local staff, disputes between Chinese employers and local employees occur 
a lot’. In particular, ‘the most common types of  labour dispute cases are 
salaries below the minimum-wage standards and unfair termination’ 
(Murathe 2018). In the view of  the FKE’s Director, the level of  disputes 
results from an unfamiliarity with Kenya’s labour law on behalf  of  the 
firms, leading them ‘to violate the law without knowing it’ (ibid.).
5 Conclusion
The BRI can, and already is, providing infrastructure, such as for 
transport. The new industry parks are under development – some 
offering specific knowledge, skills, science and technology sharing, and 
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employment. There is also collaboration in vocational training, science 
and technology research, postgraduate collaboration, and cooperation 
around the environment and health. Nonetheless, Kenya’s experience 
illustrates the dual pressures on governments engaged in the BRI. In 
one respect, the Kenyan government is able to elaborate its national 
and regional development priorities, but needs critical funding and 
implementation capacity to achieve its aims. Kenya’s experience also 
demonstrates the complexities and challenges involved with issues of  
debt servicing, project management, and employment practices.
The BRI is a work in progress. It is relatively new to the global arena 
and, as the second BRF’s List of  Deliverables indicates, it is still finding 
its way and seeking to address the substantive issues and questions 
through gatherings such as the BRF. With respect to policy lessons, then, 
for China it is that the BRI process needs to address systematically the 
issue of  partner debt serviceability and ensure that the BRI’s new Debt 
Sustainability Framework works effectively and equitably; that Green 
Silk Road principles and aims are followed and are synchronised with 
SDGs 13, 14, and 15 to mitigate climate change, and protect life on 
land and below water; and that the tendering and contract processes are 
transparent, fair, and equitable.
The management and employment culture, and the practices 
of  Chinese and other BRI project enterprises, need to be based 
on principles of  inclusivity, equality, and strong corporate social 
responsibility, thereby fulfilling the aims of  decent work and economic 
growth in SDG 8. For China’s BRI partners, their approach to 
the BRI needs to be firmly embedded in financial prudence and 
provisions for tendering transparency and open procurement. The 
Chinese government has moved into a more sober stance regarding 
the BRI, with a closer attention to risk exposure, project monitoring, 
and outcomes assessment, and the BRI’s members too are seeking to 
maximise their benefits from the BRI whilst minimising their risks.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
1 Jing Gu, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
2 Shen Qiu, Head of  Consulting Services Division and Assistant 
Research Fellow, Center for International Knowledge on 
Development (CIKD), China.
3 The One Belt, One Road Initiative was officially launched in 2013, 
with the stated aim to connect major Eurasian economies through 
infrastructure, trade, and investment. The Chinese government 
drafted and published the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road in 2015 
to promote the implementation of  the Initiative.
4 Information gathered from the Belt and Road Portal:  
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10076.
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5 Information gathered from Trading Economics:  
https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/indicators.
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